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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Michael Kelly (hereinafter "Kelly") has no objection to the Natu
re of the 
Case and Proceedings sections of Appellant Wagner's opening brief. 
The facts presented by Appellant Ms. Wagner's counsel are also accepted
, subject to the 
suggestions as to a more appropriate construction, as set forth below. 
Respondent Michael Kelly was represented at trial by Attorney Jeffrey Ch
ild. Mr. Child 
began his presentation, with Mr. Kelly on the witness stand, by carefully e
xamining Mr. Kelly 
(Tr. p. 6, L. 6 generally) about the work he and his company (a proprietors
hip) had performed for 
Ms. Wagner on property she and her deceased husband owned in Hayden,
 Idaho, over the course 
of approximately 18 months. (Tr. p. 11, L. 15-16), beginning in 2004. Ms
. Wagner appears in 
the caption of this case as someone who was, at the time, doing business a
s "Diversified 
Financial Management Group", and we soon learn that Pamela Wagner an
d her late husband had 
planned on using the building that is the subject of this litigation as a plac
e of business, as well as 
a personal residence. (Tr. p. 72, L. 13-16) 
Through the next several pages of the transcript, Mr. Child was able to ad
mit his Exhibit 
I (Tr. p. 10, L. 2-6), Mr. Kelly's occupational license (electrical), he had M
r. Kelly explain that 
he was acting as a general contractor for the various jobs he handled for M
s. Wagner, and he 
explained how the financial relationship between his company and Ms. W
agner worked. ( See Tr. 
12, p. 19-24) Other than Exhibit I, Exhibits 2-7 related to the amount of p
ayment that Kelly 
argued remained due from appellant, Ms. Wagner, to Mr. Kelly for work don
e by Kelly and his 
crew to the Wagner property. These exhibits were admitted without objectio
n. 
Mr. Kelly testified at trial that, from the beginning, he was basically proposin
g to do the 
work Ms. Wagner wished to have done to her new home-office building on a
 "cost plus" type of 
arrangement, where he would charge Ms. Wagner what it cost him to get the
 work done, plus an 
additional 10-15% as his "profit" (Tr. 14, L. 6-15). This arrangement seemed to work
 quite well 
for several months. Toward the end of the relationship, however, Ms. Wagne
r was continuing to 
request bids for "several other big things, indoor swimming pool and a few o
ther items that 
would take another (sic) quite a bit of time." (Tr. 16 L. 3-6). The relationship sou
red, though, 
after Mr. Kelly had failed to timely pay a subcontractor, resulting in a lien be
ing filed against the 
Wagner building. Ms. Wagner then decided to hire one of Mr. Kelly's work
ers to take over as 
the new foreman for her project. Mr. Kelly's testimony was that, even thoug
h it only took a 
week or so to get the lien released, that incident caused Ms. Wagner to make
 the decision to 
replace him. (Tr. 16, L. 7-25). 
Mr. Kelly further testified that during the course of his relationship with Ms.
 Wagner, he 
would sit down with Ms. Wagner periodically, look over a list of projects tha
t she wanted to have 
done, and then prepare a written proposal covering the expected cost of perfo
rming the items on 
her list. (Tr. 12, L. 19-25). This methodology seemed to work between the partie
s for a fairly 
long period of time, Mr. Kelly testifying that he had submitted and been paid
 for approximately 
2 
"40" proposals that he completed, with essentially no complaints from Ms. Wagner. 
(Tr. 13, L. 8). Mr. Kelly testified at trial that Ms. Wagner, towards the end of his job with her, 
and for the first time in the long professional relationship Mr. Kelly had with her, failed to pay 
Mr. Kelly for his work, and that of his crew. Even though Exhibits 2-7 were all admitted without 
objection, and were accurately reflected in Exhibit 9, Mr. Kelly's demand letter seeking payment, 
Ms. Wagner simply refused to pay the amount that the trial judge found was still due and owing, 
a net principal amount of$4,694.64. That amount was based on Mr. Kelly's unpaid invoices, 
minus some unfinished work by Mr. Kelly and an attorney's fee that Ms. Wagner had to pay in 
connection with the lien release issue. 
Exhibit 9, the demand letter, makes a demand for recovery of attorney's fees in the event 
suit is required, as of course it was, and Exhibit 9 references I. C. § 12-120 as the basis for an 
award of fees by the Trial Court, pursuant to the holding in Keybank Nat'/ Association v. PAL I, 
LLC, 155 Idaho 287,311 P. 3d 299 (2013). The date of Exhibit 9 is February 13, 2006. The 
Complaint in this matter was dated February 27, 2009. 
I. C. § 12-120(3) excludes from an award of fees "transactions for personal or household 
purposes". The issue of whether attorney's fees should be awarded in this case does not appear 
to have been addressed in the litigation below. However, it is clear that if multiple offices were 
being incorporated in Wagner's building, under the name "Diversified Financial Management 
Group", as Mr. Kelly worked on it, such work would not have been for "personal or household 
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purposes", and fees would be recoverable by the prevailing party. (See Tr. p.72, L. 
13-16 for a 
brief description of Ms. Wagner's plans). 
The trial judge, Hon. John P. Luster, retired after his decision in this case was writte
n. In 
that decision he wrote that "The Court finds [the] testimony [ of Michael Kelly J persuasive in 
establishing that Kelly performed work for Wagner for which he has not been paid 
in the amount 
of$9,429.64. (R., p. 6 of 44). 
Judge Luster then analyzed the counterclaim that Wagner filed against Kelly and fo
und 
that Kelly was paid $4,285.00 for work on the rear entry of the Wagner property tha
t was 
inadequately completed, and subtracted that amount from the award to Kelly. Finall
y, Judge 
Luster found that Ms. Wagner had been required to pay $450.00 to an attorney in or
der to obtain 
a lien release, and found that Kelly was responsible for that required payment. That
 brought the 
net award to Kelly to $4,694.64 as of July 15, 2013. (See R., p. 29 of 44). 
On January 9, 2014, the docket entry reads "JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY COUN
SEL 
FOR KELLY AS DIRECTED IN THE DECISION UPON COURT TRIAL FILED
 7/16/13." 
(Caps in original) . 
On January 31, 2014 the docket shows that Wagner filed an objection to Plaintiff's 
(Kelly's) Proposed Judgment. It appears at that point that Judge Luster's responsibi
lity for the 
case was passed on to the newly appointed District Judge, Rich Christensen, and the
 issue 
became whether pre-judgment interest should be awarded to Mr. Kelly. On April 25
, 2014, Judge 
4 
Christensen issued his opinion that pre-judgment interest was appropriate in this case, and that it 
should be awarded to Michael Kelly. (R. p. 32 of 44). 
The final judgment in this case was executed by Judge Christensen on May 20, 2014, in 
favor of Respondent Michael Kelly, in the net amount of $13,762.54, and it is that judgment 
from which this appeal was filed. 
5 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Was it error for the District Court to find that Kelly was owed any amounts 
because Kelly did could (sic) not testify if the invoices he submitted for payment 
had been paid or not? 
B. Was it error for the District Court to conclude that Kelly and Wagner did not have 
an open account agreement because Kelly testified on more than one occasion that 
the Wagner home was a project and he estimated each part of that project? 
C. Was it error for the District Court to award Kelly any sums because Kelly did not 
present any evidence of the charges to or payments made toward Wagner's 
account? 
D. Was it error to award Kelly prejudgment interest because the amount owed to him 
was subject to conflicting evidence that had to be resolved by the Trial Court and 
because Wagner was awarded damages for construction defects? 
E. Is Wagner entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Brief sets forth issues on appeal in an acceptable w
ay, and respondent will 
therefore construct his argument on the basis of the statement o
f issues provided by appellant. 
The issues identified by Appellant will be treated in order below
: 
A. Was ii error for the District Court 10 find that Kelly was
 owed any amounts 
because Kelly did could (sic) not testify if the invoices he su
bmi//edfor payment 
had been paid or not? 
No, it was not error. We can overlook the obvious proofreadin
g error in order to 
understand what Appellant means. The defense offered by Ms. 
Wagner as set forth above, was 
simply that Mr. Kelly had the burden of proving, in some way o
ther than he did, that he had not 
been paid on the invoices admitted in evidence as Exhibits 2-7.
 This issue offers an opportunity 
to analyze how trial evidence is supposed to work. Mr. Kelly u
nequivocally testified that the 6 
exhibits he submitted, his invoices, had not been paid. His testi
mony was clear, definitive, and 
credible. Judge Luster responded to that testimony by awardin
g Kelly judgment for the net 
amount of Mr. Kelly's claim, and Judge Christensen then added
 in pre-judgment interest to that 
claim, for a total judgment of $13,762.54 as of April 25, 2015. 
(R., p. 35 of 44). 
In the ordinary case involving payment of money, the problem 
might be for the person in 
Ms. Wagner's position to present evidence that she had paid th
e invoices, such as by offering the 
cancelled checks used to pay them, since she testified that she a
lways paid by check, noting the 
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check number on the invoice so that she could ke
ep track. (Tr. p. 78, L.15-22). No evidence was 
ever offered to support Ms. Wagner's conclusion,
 and Judge Luster rejected it. 
Had she shown evidence of overpayment or defec
tive workmanship, or complete non-
performance by Kelly, if those were her contentio
ns, certainly the Court could have decided 
differently than he did. She did not, and the Cour
t therefore had nothing to act upon other than 
the non-payment of Mr. Kelly's last 7 invoices. 
B. Was it error for the District Court to concl
ude that Kelly and Wagner did not 
have an open account agreement because Kelly t
estified on more than one 
occasion that the Wagner home was a project and
 he estimated each part of that 
project? 
No, it was not error. The issue arose upon couns
el's oral Motion to Dismiss at the 
conclusion of Mr. Kelly's evidence, at which poin
t Mr. Child stated: "The open account concept 
has taken me by surprise, quite frankly. And if tha
t is going to be the issue that the case turns on, 
I would ask the Court for an opportunity to brief 
that issue." (Tr. p. 54, L. 20-23). 
The Court responded, "Well, I guess the Court's p
osition right now was, is that its not 
inclined to grant the motion to dismiss. The moti
on to dismiss, I think, certainly at this state of 
the juncture certainly requires the Court to first ac
cept the truth of the evidence of the adverse 
party that has been offered here by the plaintiff an
d draw every reasonable inference in favor of 
Mr. Kelly's case. 
The objection here with respect to the open accou
nt, this has not been brought as an 
action alleging an open account, but it certainly w
as an action alleging that there were contracts 
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for services to be provided and certain services were provided to Mrs
. Wagner over a period of 
time, and that there was an unpaid balance. And that's essentially wh
at's been alleged." (Tr. p. 
55., L. 1.-13). 
Judge Luster continued: "And to the extent that that requires Mr. Ke
lley to establish that 
the services provided were reasonable, the testimony that's been offe
red here is that he had done 
work for Ms. Wagner in the past, that he prepared an invoice that des
ignated a certain job, he 
would sit down with her, they'd discuss the invoice, she would pay th
e invoice, and that this was 
the course of dealing that he had with Ms. Wagner through the cours
e of their business 
relationship until the final six invoices were presented to her. Appare
ntly, these were not paid." 
(Tr. p. 55, L. 14-24). 
The Court below specifically found that "The proposition that the en
tirety of the account 
needs to be established or proven by Mr. Kelley, I don't believe the C
ourt's inclined to agree that 
that's what the law does require." (Tr. p. 56, L. 10-13). 
C. Was it error for the District Court 10 award Kelly any sums because
 Kelly did not 
present any evidence of the charges to or payment made toward Wagner's
 
account? 
No, it was not error. Respondent respectfully suggests that this issue
 is a repetition of 
Issue A., above. The Court found that the arrangement between parti
es had an established 
"course of dealings" which constituted a series of contracts for partic
ular services to be 
performed by Mr. Kelly and paid for by Ms. Wagner. Mr. Kelly prod
uced and admitted into 
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evidence the documents showing his work and materials supplied to Ms. Wagner. (Ex
hibit 2-7). 
He testified that those invoices were not paid. Ms. Wagner failed to submit any evide
nce to the 
contrary. Judge Luster agreed. 
D. Was ii error to award Kelly prejudgment interest because the amount owed to him 
was subject to conflicting evidence that had to be resolved by the Trial Court and 
because Wagner was awarded damages for construction defects? 
No, it was not error. Judge Christensen wrote the Memorandum Opinion of the issue
 of 
prejudgment interest, (R. p. 32-37 of 44). There the Court explained that "Reading Ervin (Erv
in 
Construction Co. v. Van Orden, J 25 Idaho 738 (Cr. App. 1992) and Suebert (Seubert Excavato
rs, 
Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 409,871 P.2d 826 (1994) permitted prejudgment inter
est to be 
properly awarded to Kelly in this case, but not to Wagner. The reason for that is "the 
two claims 
in the case (the one before the Court), like the claim in Seubert, arise under the same contract
 but 
are not so closely related that the unliquidated claim renders the [ amount of the] liqui
dated claim 
unascertainable." Seubert, supra. 
E. ls Wagner entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal? 
No, Wagner is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. In Idaho the writer 
believes it is correct to say that, generally all fee shifting statutes, such as I. C. § 12-120, 
condition an award of fees upon the recipient being the "prevailing party". Ms. Wagn
er does not 
qualify as the prevailing party in this litigation. 
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Perhaps more significantly, however, is the fact that no determination as to an award of 
fees was made by the District Court. A Memorandum of Costs and Fees was filed by Mr. Kelly 
within the requisite time period, however it was objected to by Ms. Wagner. When the issues of 
costs and fees was brought back before Judge Christensen, quite recently (March 30, 2016), an 
"Order Staying Pending Remittitur from Idaho Supreme Court" was entered (April 4, 2016), so it 
could be argued that the issue of fees is not presently ripe for appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As in every appeal, it is incumbent upon the Respondent to remind this Court that, as 
pointed out by opposing counsel, the "trial court's findings of fact. ... will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous." Appellant's Brief on Appeal, p.7, citing Bird v. Bidwell, 147 
Idaho 350 (2009). 
"Decision·s by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated 
questions of law (which are reviewable de novo}, questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), 
and matters of discretion (reviewable for abuse of discretion)." 9'" Cir. Guides, citing Harman v. 
Apfel, 211 F3d 1172 (9'" Cir. 2000). 
A good source for authoritative material on this subject is Rule 52(a), J.R.C.P., which sets 
forth the basic rule oflaw, and explains that " ... regard shall be given to the special opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appear personally before it." 
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P., in relevant part. 
II 
Respondent believes that the District Judges who decided this case were correct, and th
at 
Judge Luster, in particular, who had the opportunity to hear testimony personally, form
ed his 
conclusions in this case based to some large extent on witness credibility. 
We urge this Court to allow the Findings and Conclusions entered in the written decisio
ns 
of the two judges below to stand. Those decisions should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this li day of l::'L1 ft'/, 2016. 
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CAMEROPHILiws' 
Attorney for Respondent 
